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The United States is on an unsustainable 
fiscal path. Pew projects that, absent 
any corrective action, federal debt held 
by the public will rise to 111 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025 
and reach the unprecedented level of 
158 percent of GDP in 2035. Over time, 
excessive federal debt can raise interest 
rates, crowd out private capital, stifle 
productivity and stunt the growth of 
wages. 
The biggest drivers of federal debt growth 
—by far—are interest payments on the 
debt and certain “mandatory” programs 
that Congress need not reauthorize every 
year, especially Medicare and Medicaid.  
However, “discretionary” spending—the 
money that Congress allocates annually  
to areas such as defense, education  
and transportation—comprises about 
40 percent of the current federal budget. 
One widely-mentioned option to help 
rein in deficits and stabilize the debt is a 
freeze or cap on discretionary spending 
that still provides policy makers the 
ability to prioritize spending within broad 
categories. Individuals and organizations 
across the political spectrum, including 
President Obama and Republicans in 
Congress, have proposed discretionary 
spending freezes. 
Although the non-partisan Pew Fiscal 
Analysis Initiative makes no  
recommendation on a discretionary 
spending cap, it finds that if policy  
makers choose to enact such a freeze  
it could contribute meaningfully to a 
broader plan for lowering the deficit and 
debt, but would not solve the problem 
alone. Pew recognizes, however, that  
immediate implementation of such a 
freeze could be a drag on an already  
fragile economy, and the timing of any  
fiscal action will be an important  
consideration. In addition, because a  
discretionary freeze would result in  
reduced funding for certain programs 
which could impact service delivery, 
policy makers should retain the flexibility 
to prioritize spending under any freeze.  
This report models four freeze options to 
gauge how much each would save over 
10 years. In addition, Pew calculated the 
10-year effects of each proposal on the 
federal deficit and publicly-held debt.
Executive Summary
ExECuTivE Summary
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 A five-year freeze of non-security 
discretionary budget authority at 
its nominal 2011 level, based on a 
similar proposal by President Obama 
in his fiscal year 2012 budget, would 
save $377 billion over the next 
decade, the least amount of the four 
options.  
 An option based on the Republican 
“Pledge to America” and related 
legislation would reduce 2011 
non-security discretionary budget 
authority to its inflation-adjusted 
fiscal year 2008 level and cap growth 
at the rate of inflation thereafter. 
It ranks third in overall savings, 
reducing federal debt by $400 billion 
after 10 years.
 The final report of the National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform proposes a freeze on 
both security and non-security 
discretionary budget authority at 
their nominal fiscal year 2011 levels 
for one year, with a subsequent 
rollback to its inflation-adjusted fiscal 
year 2008 level. This plan would save 
$1.5 trillion between 2012 and 2021, 
more than any other option Pew 
analyzed. 
 Finally, an option included in the 
report issued by the Bipartisan Policy 
Center would freeze nominal fiscal 
year 2011 non-defense discretionary 
budget authority for four years 
and defense discretionary budget 
authority for five years. After that, 
growth would be limited to increases 
in the GDP. Forty-eight percent of 
the savings in this plan would occur 
by 2016, a higher proportion than in 
any other option. Overall, it would 
save $583 billion over 10 years, the 
second highest savings of the options 
Pew analyzed. 
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The recent recession coupled with 
legislation enacted in the past decade 
has pushed the federal deficit to historic 
levels. In fiscal year 20091, it reached 
9.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) ($1.4 trillion2), the highest relative 
to the economy since World War II. The 
deficit declined to 8.9 percent of GDP 
($1.3 trillion) in fiscal year 2010, but 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projects that it will rise again to 9.8 
percent of GDP ($1.5 trillion) in fiscal 
year 2011. Pew projects that the gap 
between spending and revenues will 
shrink over the following three years, but 
will resume growing after fiscal year 2014, 
reaching 11.6 percent of GDP by 2035 
(see Figure 1). These deficit levels are 
introduction: Deficits, Debt and 
the Economy
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significantly higher than the 3-percent-
of-GDP-or-less ratio that economists 
generally recommend for long-term 
deficits.3 As a result of these deficits, Pew 
projects that publicly-held federal debt 
will rise to 111 percent of GDP in 2025 
and reach the unprecedented level of  
158 percent of GDP by 2035.
The major drivers of spending growth 
between now and 2035 (other than net 
interest on federal debt) are Medicare, 
Medicaid and certain other federal health 
benefits, as well as to a lesser extent Social 
Security (see Figure 2). These mandatory 
programs made up 42 percent of all 
federal spending in fiscal year 2010. Pew 
estimates that their share of spending 
will rise to 48 percent by 2035. CBO 
projects that the unavoidable aging of the 
U.S. population will contribute almost 
two-thirds of the cost growth in these 
programs through 2035 (see Figure 3). 
CBO attributes the remaining one-third 
to the rapid growth in health care costs. 
The federal government could choose 
to cut benefits for future and/or current 
recipients of Medicare, Medicaid and 
Social Security. But stabilizing the federal 
debt at 60 percent of GDP in 2035 by 
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only cutting mandatory programs would 
require an immediate and permanent 
cut of 24 percent in these programs, 
which would affect current beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, Congress does not routinely 
revisit the funding for mandatory 
programs, and it would be politically 
difficult for Congress to pass a deficit-
reduction plan that relies exclusively on 
cuts in mandatory spending.
By contrast, federal discretionary 
spending, which includes most 
funding for areas such as defense, 
education, transportation and NASA, 
is not a long-term deficit driver. CBO 
projects discretionary spending to 
shrink as a share of the economy over 
the next 25 years (see Figure 2). As 
a share of all federal spending, Pew 
projects discretionary programs will 
fall from 39 percent in fiscal year 2010 
to 22 percent in fiscal year 2035 as 
mandatory and interest spending grow. 
Nevertheless, discretionary spending is 
still significant—$1.35 trillion in fiscal 
year 2010—and because Congress votes 
on discretionary spending every year, there 
are more frequent opportunities to make 
adjustments. 
One way Congress could address 
discretionary spending over the long-term 
would be to either freeze it in nominal 
terms (not adjusted for inflation) or cap 
its annual growth at some benchmark 
rate. In fact, several policy makers have 
proposed discretionary freezes. Both 
President Obama’s fiscal year 2012 budget 
and the September 2010 Republican 
Pledge to America propose variations of 
a discretionary spending freeze.4 Recent 
deficit-reduction plans also include 
freezes.
However, mechanically applying a 
discretionary freeze across the board to  
all categories of spending would deny 
policy makers the flexibility to shift 
spending priorities. By contrast, an 
overall freeze on aggregate discretionary 
spending accompanied by the flexibility to 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (2009).
NOTE: The interaction effect between excess cost growth and 
aging has been distributed.
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make spending adjustments within each 
category would give policy makers the 
ability to set funding and policy priorities. 
Within broad categories of spending, 
policy makers could adjust funding of 
individual programs and shift funding 
between programs, as long as the sum of 
all spending stayed below the freeze level.
When to cut spending is just as important 
a consideration as how to cut spending. 
The debate over deficit reduction comes 
at a time of lingering economic weakness. 
Even though the recession officially 
ended in June 2009, according to the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 
unemployment in March 2011 was at  
8.8 percent, far from the 5.2 percent 
CBO considers to be the long-term 
natural rate of unemployment that occurs 
during periods of full employment. The 
Federal Reserve, CBO and the Blue Chip 
consensus of economic forecasters all 
project that unemployment will remain  
at or above 8 percent through 2012.
It is true that high deficits and debt can 
cause long-term economic damage, 
but cutting spending too deeply, too 
soon may derail the recovery. During an 
economic downturn, there is evidence 
that temporary deficits that finance tax 
cuts or spending hikes may help bolster 
the economy (see Box 1). Similarly, 
attacking deficits with tax hikes or 
spending cuts during a downturn may 
prolong it by undermining output and 
employment growth. However, persistent 
and permanent deficits—and the resulting 
increase in federal debt—can inflict long-
term economic damage by raising interest 
rates, crowding out private investment, 
slowing productivity and wage growth 
and making the U.S. more dependent on 
foreign lenders. It, therefore, is important 
for policy makers to guard against both 
the risks of acting too early to reduce the 
deficit and debt and the risks of waiting 
too long. 
This report by the Pew Fiscal Analysis 
Initiative examines the fiscal and economic 
impacts of a discretionary spending freeze. 
It models several proposed freeze options 
to gauge how much each would save over 
10 years. In addition, Pew calculated the 
10-year effects of each proposal on the 
federal deficit and publicly-held debt. 
Discretionary spending is not a driver of 
debt growth over the long-term under 
Pew projections, and no discretionary 
freeze would be a panacea. Nevertheless, a 
freeze could be a credible source of deficit 
reduction if Congress and the president 
choose to lower the burden borne by 
benefit cuts and tax hikes. 
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BOX 1: ThE UnCERTAIn MACROECOnOMIC 
EFFECTS OF A DISCRETIOnARy SPEnDIng FREEzE
pew’s analysis of the discretionary spending freezes does not consider how a freeze 
might effect behavior, productivity or gDp . the decreases in government spending 
resulting from a discretionary spending freeze likely would have both short-term and 
long-term macroeconomic effects . 
the net marginal effect of government spending on gDp, often called the fiscal 
multiplier, is a controversial topic in macroeconomics .1 the conventional economic 
view is that during a recession when the economy is operating below capacity and 
the Federal reserve may be unwilling or unable to counteract an activist fiscal policy, 
increasing deficit-financed government spending will, on net, bolster real (inflation-
adjusted) gDp in the short-term . these positive effects, however, will fade and even 
turn negative over the long-term as the economy recovers, especially if the federal 
government does not act to reduce deficits . 
there are several empirical studies supporting this view . a 2002 paper by olivier 
Blanchard and roberto perotti finds that an extra $1 of government purchases raised 
real gDp by $0 .50 after one year, a multiplier of 0 .5 .2, 3 alan auerbach and yuriy 
gorodnichenko find that the multiplier for government spending peaks at 2 .5 during 
a recession and 0 .6 during a recovery .4 several macroeconomic models widely used 
in policy analysis, such as CBo’s, also assume positive spending multipliers, implying 
that spending cuts resulting from a discretionary spending freeze would lower real 
gDp .5
However, alberto alesina and silvia ardagna6 as well as roberto perotti7 have found 
that spending cuts enacted during times of fiscal stress (e .g . high deficits) do less 
harm to the economy and may even cause real gDp to grow . some studies that find 
positive multipliers during recessions, such as auerbach and gorodnichenko, also 
find smaller and even negative multipliers during expansions .
Despite uncertainty about the precise effect a discretionary spending freeze would 
have on employment and output, there is evidence of a risk to the economic growth 
if government spending were cut too deeply, too soon . 
1 For an overview, see Alan Auerbach et al, “Activist Fiscal Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(4), Fall 2010,  pp. 141-164.
2 Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti, “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes 
on Output,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), Nov 2002, pp. 1329-68.
3 Because government purchases are counted as part of total GDP, a multiplier between 0 and 1 implies that government purchases raise total 
GDP but partially crowd out private spending.
4 Alan Auerbach and Yuriy Gorodnichenko, “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 16311, August 2010.
5 Congressional Budget Office, “Estimated Macroeconomic Impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” March 2009. 
6 Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, “Tales of Fiscal Adjustments,” Economic Policy 13(27), pp. 487-545.
7 Roberto Perotti, “Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(4), November 1999, pp. 1399-1436.
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When Congress passes a budget, it is 
actually passing a series of appropriations 
bills that grant permission to the various 
parts of the federal government to enter 
into financial obligations. The amount of 
obligations into which each agency may 
enter—basically the amount each agency is 
allowed to spend—is that agency’s budget 
authority. What the agency actually spends 
is an outlay. Although Congress directly 
controls budget authority, outlays are the 
appropriate measure of federal spending 
for the purposes of calculating the effect 
of a discretionary freeze on the federal 
deficit and debt. The terms “outlays” and 
“spending” will be used interchangeably 
throughout this report (see Box 2 for a 
glossary of technical terms). 
Over the past decade, total federal 
spending has increased by about  
29 percent relative to the economy. In 
fiscal year 2010, all federal spending 
totaled about $3.5 trillion or 23.8 percent  
of GDP, whereas in fiscal year 2000,  
federal spending totaled $1.8 trillion  
or 18.4 percent of GDP.5  Furthermore, 
over the next 10 years Pew projects that 
federal spending will continue its upward 
trajectory, growing to $6 trillion, or  
25 percent of GDP, by fiscal year 2021. 
Federal spending can be divided into three 
main categories: discretionary, mandatory 
and interest on the debt.
Congress decides every year how much to 
spend on discretionary programs through 
the appropriations process. This includes 
money to pay for the cabinet departments, 
such as the Departments of Defense and 
Transportation, executive branch agencies 
such as NASA and the ongoing overseas 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Discretionary spending funds federal 
programs such as Head Start, Community 
Development Block Grants, highway 
construction and new weapons systems. 
It also covers the day-to-day operating 
expenses of the federal government, 
including the salaries of federal workers. 
Discretionary spending in fiscal year 2010 
totaled $1.35 trillion or about 39 percent 
of the total federal budget (see Figure 4).6 
The CBO baseline projects that nominal 
discretionary spending will grow by an 
Discretionary Spending and the 
Federal budget
2
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BOX 2: glOSSARy OF TERMS 
Budget Authority – amount of financial obligations, designated in annual 
appropriations laws, that the federal government can enter into that could eventually 
result in federal outlays .
Outlays – the amount spent (as represented by checks written from the treasury) 
by a federal agency to liquidate financial obligations . this report also uses the term 
“spending” to refer to outlays .
Deficit – the amount by which spending exceeds revenues in a given year . 
Publicly-Held Federal Debt – all outstanding U .s . treasury securities held by 
nonfederal government entities . the stock of federal debt increases every year by the 
amount of the deficit plus other means of financing (such as asset sales) .
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – the value of all the goods and services produced 
within a country’s borders in a given year . 
Fiscal Year – the budgeting period of the federal government, which runs from 
october 1 through september 30 .
average annual rate of 1.6 percent between 
2010 and 2021 (see Appendix A). 
Mandatory spending was $1.9 trillion, or 
55 percent of the federal budget, in fiscal 
year 2010.7 This category of spending 
includes among other things most federal 
entitlement programs such as Medicare, 
Medicaid and Social Security, as well as 
certain veterans’ benefits, unemployment 
insurance and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP). Unlike 
discretionary spending, Congress does not 
need to decide how much to spend on 
mandatory programs each year; instead, 
annual spending levels are determined 
mostly by eligibility rules, benefit formulas 
and the participation rate, as well as 
demographic shifts and changes in the 
economy. Budget authority for these 
programs has already been provided under 
current law and will continue unless 
and until Congress chooses to change 
the applicable law. Pew projects average 
annual growth in nominal mandatory 
spending to be 5.3 percent over the next 
10 years, more than three times that of 
discretionary spending. 
The final category, interest on the debt, 
includes the government’s interest 
payments on publicly-held federal debt, 
tHe peW CHaritaBle trUsts10
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which is all outstanding U.S. Treasury 
securities held by nonfederal entities, 
such as banks, sovereign wealth funds 
and individual investors. The federal 
government paid $197 billion in interest 
on the debt in fiscal year 2010, about  
6 percent of the total budget.8 Pew 
projects that rapidly rising debt and 
higher interest rates over the next decade 
will cause nominal interest payments to 
soar, growing at an average annual rate of 
15.8 percent over the next 10 years. The 
federal government can only cut interest 
payments by reducing federal debt or 
adjusting monetary policy. 
CBO projects that discretionary spending 
will grow more slowly than interest on 
the debt or mandatory spending over the 
next decade. However, a comprehensive 
plan for stabilizing the debt—including 
adjustments to discretionary and 
mandatory spending as well as revenues 
—will make the necessary remedies easier. 
Controlling discretionary spending can 
play a part in a larger plan for reducing 
deficits and stabilizing the debt and 
there are several proposals that are 
being considered by policy makers for 
addressing growth in this part of the 
budget.
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Discretionary
$1,349 Billion
39%
Net Interest
$197 Billion
6%
Natural Resources and 
Environment $42 Bil; 1% 
Administration of 
Justice $32 Bil; 1% 
Science, Space and 
Technology $30 Bil; 1% 
Security
National Defense **$689 Bil; 20% 
Non-Defense Security *$141 Bil; 4% 
Education, Training, Employment 
and Social Services $134 Bil; 4% 
Transportation $77 Bil; 2% 
Income Security $69 Bil; 2% 
Health $65 Bil; 2% 
Other $66 Bil; 2% 
Components of Federal Outlays, Fiscal Year 2010 
SOURCE: Pew analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2011) data.
*Includes Departments of Homeland Security, State and Veterans Affairs, as well as all remaining components of budget 
function 150 (international affairs).
**Includes Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration, as well as overseas operations funding. 
NOTE: Fiscal year 2010 is the latest fiscal year for which a detailed breakdown of actual outlays is publicly available.
Mandatory
$1,910 Billion
55%
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BOX 3: DISCRETIOnARy SPEnDIng gROwTh 
PROjECTIOnS
as required by Congress, CBo’s January 
2011 current law baseline of future 
discretionary spending assumes that 
discretionary budget authority grows 
only at the rate of inflation . CBo makes 
no judgment in its baseline about the 
value of different spending, nor does 
its baseline predict future changes in 
policy . some analysts believe that this 
assumption understates the likely level 
of future spending growth . economists 
alan auerbach and William gale, for 
example, regularly calculate their own 
projections of federal spending under 
the assumption that some discretionary 
budget authority grows by inflation 
and population .1 the Bipartisan policy 
Center’s Debt reduction task Force, 
headed by pete Domenici and alice 
rivlin, released a report in november 
2010 with a baseline assuming that 
nominal discretionary budget authority 
would grow with gDp over the next  
10 years .2
adjusting discretionary budget authority 
(excluding funding for overseas 
operations) for inflation and population 
growth raises cumulative discretionary 
outlays between 2012 and 2021 by about 
4 percent or $606 billion . adjusting by 
gDp growth instead raises cumulative 
discretionary outlays between 2012 and 
2021 by 12 percent or $1 .7 trillion (see 
figure 5) .
pew’s projections of the federal deficit 
and debt use the CBo current law 
baseline of discretionary budget authority 
and outlays, which grows at the rate of 
inflation . Using an alternative baseline 
that assumes discretionary budget 
authority growing at either inflation and 
population growth or gDp growth would 
increase the cost savings of each freeze 
option analyzed in this report over  
10 years relative to the cost savings from 
applying them to the pew baseline, but it 
would not affect the final deficit and debt 
projections from these options . 
1 Alan Auerbach and William Gale, “Tempting Fate: The Federal 
Budget Outlook,” Brookings, 8 February 2011. Note that Auerbach 
and Gale also significantly adjusted the costs of overseas operations 
after 2010. 
2 Bipartisan Policy Center, “Restoring America’s Future,” 17 November 
2010. Accessed at http://bit.ly/cIGZtq on 22 November 2010.
NOTE: The series below presents the data underlying an 
alternative approach to the Figure in Box 1-2 in which the effect 
of the interaction between aging and excess cost growth is 
separated rather than allocated. (See the discussion in the box 
for an explanation of the two approaches.) This data was added 
to the file on July 2, 2009.
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SOURCE: Pew calculations using Congressional Budget Office (2011) and U.S. Census data.
NOTE: Overseas operations funding is assumed to be the same under all three projections.
“GDP-Adjusted” means that discretionary budget authority grows at the same rate as GDP. 
“Inflation & Population Adjusted” means that discretionary budget authority grows at the combined rate of 
population growth and inflation.
Figure 5
Projections of Nominal Discretionary 
Outlays Under Three Assumptions, 
Fiscal Years 2011 – 2021
SOURCE: Pew calculations using Congressional 
Budget Office (2011) and U.S. Census data.
NOTES: Overseas operations funding is assumed to 
be the same under all three projections.
“GDP-Adjusted” means that discretionary budget 
authority grows at the same rate as GDP. 
“Inflation & Population Adjusted” means that 
discretionary budget authority grows at the combined 
rate of population growth and inflation.
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parameters of each  
Freeze option
Pew modeled the federal fiscal effects of 
four discretionary spending freeze options, 
each based on a prominent legislative 
proposal introduced over the past two 
years. The options are summarized in 
Table 1.
Option 1 is based on the freeze proposed 
in the president’s fiscal year 2012 budget. 
The actual budget proposal is a five-year 
freeze of fiscal year 2010 nominal non-
security discretionary budget authority 
with growth capped at inflation thereafter.9 
To make this freeze comparable with 
others, however, Pew applied it to fiscal 
year 2011 budget authority rather than 
fiscal year 2010 as it was originally 
proposed, and extended the freeze through 
fiscal year 2016 rather than fiscal year 
2015.
Option 2 is based on the freeze described 
in the 2010 Republican “Pledge to 
America” and related legislation. Pew 
applied the freeze to the fiscal year 2012 
to 2021 period rather than the 2011 to 
2020 period as it was originally proposed 
to make it comparable to the other 
options. Non-security discretionary budget 
authority for fiscal year 2012 is rolled back 
to its inflation-adjusted fiscal year 2008 
level. Growth thereafter is capped  
at inflation.10
Option 3 is the freeze described in the 
final proposal put forward by the co-chairs 
of the National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform, Erskine Bowles 
and Alan Simpson.11 The co-chairs propose 
freezing fiscal year 2011 budget authority 
for both security and non-security 
discretionary spending for one year, then 
rolling back fiscal year 2013 discretionary 
budget authority to its inflation-adjusted 
fiscal year 2008 levels.12 Security and non-
security budget authority would resume 
growing again thereafter, with annual 
growth capped at half of the inflation rate.
Option 4 is taken from a report issued 
by the Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt 
Reduction Task Force, chaired by Pete 
Domenici and Alice Rivlin. The report 
recommends freezing nominal fiscal year 
2011 non-defense discretionary budget 
authority for four years, and defense 
discretionary budget authority for five 
pew’s methodology for analyzing 
Discretionary Freezes
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years. Growth in budget authority would 
be capped at GDP growth thereafter.13 
Each of the four discretionary freeze 
options is part of a broader package of 
budgetary recommendations. Except for 
the policies included in the Pew baseline 
(see Appendix D), Pew analyzed the 
freezes in isolation from any other policy  
changes to highlight the effects entirely 
attributable to the freeze. Pew also 
analyzed each option without making  
any judgments about the relative 
effectiveness of different government 
programs, or to what extent spending  
cuts and revenue increases should be  
part of a long-term plan to reduce  
deficits and the debt.
parameters of the Freeze Options analyzed by pew
What spending is  
capped or frozen?
What level  
of budget  
authority is 
capped or frozen?
How long does 
the freeze last?
How is spending 
capped  
thereafter?
pew estimates 
of total 10-year 
savings
Option 1
Based on president’s 
Fy2012 Budget
non-security nominal Fy2011 5 years inflation $377 billion
Option 2
Based on  
republican pledge 
to america
non-security real Fy2008 n/a inflation $400 billion
Option 3
national  
Commission on 
Fiscal responsibility 
and reform  
(Bowles-simpson)
security and   
non-security
nominal Fy2011 
for first year, then 
real Fy2008
1 year Half of inflation $1,532 billion
Option 4
Bipartisan policy 
Center  
(Domenici-rivlin)
Defense and  
non-defense nominal Fy2011
5 years for  
defense, 4 years 
for non-defense
gDp growth $583 billion
Table 1
soUrCe: pew analysis . 
notes: all proposals modeled as taking effect beginning in fiscal year 2012 . 
as written, the president’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposes a five-year freeze of nominal fiscal year 2010 non-security budget 
authority lasting from fiscal years 2011 to 2015 . pew modified this option to freeze fiscal year 2011 non-security budget authority 
from fiscal years 2012 to 2016 to make it comparable to the other options . 
the pledge to america takes effect in fiscal year 2011 as written . pew modeled this option as being delayed until fiscal year 2012 
to make it comparable to the other options . the pledge does not include a cost estimate of its proposals . 
Defense includes all discretionary spending categorized as budget function 050 (national defense) . non-defense is all 
discretionary spending not in budget function 050 .
security discretionary spending includes budget functions 050, 150, and the remaining portions of the Departments of Defense, 
Homeland security, state and Veterans affairs . non-security is all remaining discretionary spending . 
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Modeling assumptions
The options analyzed in this report are 
freezes on discretionary budget authority. 
To estimate the 10-year savings associated 
with each one, Pew first calculated 
the direct savings effect relative to the 
January 2011 CBO current law baseline 
of discretionary budget authority which 
Pew did not modify. Pew then applied 
CBO’s 10-year spend-out rate assumptions 
to convert this budget authority effect 
into a direct outlay effect.14  Finally, CBO’s 
10-year interest rate assumptions were 
used to calculate the additional savings 
from reduced interest payments on  
the debt.
The proposals Pew examines classify 
discretionary spending in different 
ways. The proposal from the Bipartisan 
Policy Commission, for example, uses 
“defense” and “non-defense” as its 
spending classifiers. The CBO’s January 
2011 baseline also distinguishes between 
defense and non-defense discretionary 
spending, where defense is defined as all 
spending within federal budget function 
05015 consisting of the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Energy’s 
National Nuclear Security Administration. 
The president’s fiscal year 2012 budget, by 
contrast, distinguishes between “security” 
and “non-security” discretionary spending. 
Security, as defined in the president’s 
budget, is even broader than defense and 
includes not only the budget function 050, 
but also the Departments of Homeland 
Security, State and Veterans Affairs, plus 
various other international programs (see 
Figure 4).16 The other three freeze options 
analyzed in this report distinguish between 
security and non-security. In weighing 
each option, Pew assumed that spending 
on the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
would not be subject to the freeze.
In determining the effect that the options 
would have on the deficit and publicly- 
held debt, Pew used CBO’s January 2011 
current law baseline for discretionary 
budget authority and outlays.17 However, 
Pew modified the CBO baseline projection 
for mandatory and net interest spending 
and revenues to reflect the added costs 
of permanently adopting certain policies 
that either have been regularly enacted 
or are widely expected to be enacted 
by Congress. Because of the costs 
associated with these policies, publicly-
held federal debt under Pew’s baseline is 
higher over the next 10 years than under 
CBO’s January 2011 baseline. For more 
information about our methodology, see 
Appendix D. 
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As a percent of GDP, total discretionary 
spending grew by about 47 percent 
between fiscal year 2000 and 2010, from 
6.3 percent to 9.3 percent. The overseas 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
represent about 38 percent of this 
growth, while increases in other security 
spending comprise 33 percent. Non-
security discretionary spending growth is 
responsible for the remaining 29 percent, 
almost all of which occurred after 2009. 
Some of this increase in recent years 
has been due to recession-related effects 
and policies, such as falling or stagnant 
GDP and temporary spending increases. 
CBO projects that by fiscal year 2021, 
discretionary spending will fall to  
6.7 percent of GDP (see Figure 6 for 
spending as a percent of GDP). Moreover, 
as mandatory and interest spending grow, 
total discretionary spending will become a 
smaller portion of the federal budget.
Absent any freeze or cap, CBO projects 
cumulative discretionary spending to  
total about $14.5 trillion over the next  
10 years. Of this total, $5.0 trillion will  
be used for non-security spending,  
$7.8 trillion is projected to be spent on 
security purposes (excluding overseas 
Federal budgetary Effects of 
Discretionary Freeze Options 
Through 2021
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operations) and $1.7 trillion is dedicated 
to funding for the overseas operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Appendix 
A). For more information on how Pew 
categorized the CBO baseline by security 
and non-security spending, see  
Appendix D. 
Pew calculated the budgetary savings 
relative to the CBO current law baseline 
associated with four discretionary budget 
authority freeze proposals.
Option 1: Based on President’s Fiscal 
year 2012 Budget (Freeze 2011 
nominal non-Security Discretionary 
Budget Authority Through 2016, Cap 
growth at Inflation Thereafter)
Under this option, non-security 
discretionary budget authority could 
not exceed its fiscal year 2011 nominal 
level of $392 billion between 2012 and 
2016. Beginning in 2017, non-security 
discretionary budget authority would grow 
annually at the rate of inflation.18 Over the 
next 10 years, this option would save a 
total of $377 billion in direct and interest 
spending (see Appendix B), 25 percent 
of which would be realized by 2016 (see 
Figure 7). This would be the equivalent 
of cutting non-security discretionary 
spending permanently and immediately by 
5.5 percent beginning in fiscal year 2011.19 
This proposal saves the least through 
fiscal year 2021 of the four options Pew 
analyzed.
Option 2: Based on Republican 
Pledge to America (Roll Back and Cap 
non-Security Discretionary Budget 
Authority)
This option would cut fiscal year 2012 
non-security discretionary budget 
authority to its inflation-adjusted fiscal 
year 2008 level of $372 billion, reducing 
discretionary budget authority by  
$26 billion that year alone. Growth in 
budget authority thereafter would be 
capped at inflation. Between fiscal years 
2012 and 2021, this approach ranks 
35
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third in savings among the four options 
Pew analyzed, saving about $400 billion 
in direct spending and interest outlays. 
Thirty-four percent of this ($135 billion) 
would occur by 2016, the highest 
proportion of the four. This option’s 
10-year savings would be the equivalent 
of immediately and permanently cutting 
non-security discretionary spending by 5.8 
percent beginning in fiscal year 2011.  
Option 3: national Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform Final 
Proposal (Roll Back, Reduce and Cap 
All Discretionary Budget Authority 
Except Overseas Operations)
The final proposal put forward by the 
co-chairs of the National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
contained a discretionary freeze that 
included the following: a) keeping 
fiscal year 2012 discretionary budget 
authority (excluding overseas operations) 
at nominal 2011 levels; b) cutting fiscal 
year 2013 discretionary budget authority 
to inflation-adjusted 2008 levels; and 
c) capping growth thereafter at half the 
rate of inflation. This approach would 
save $1.5 trillion in direct and interest 
outlays between 2012 and 2021, by far 
the most of the four options. Interestingly, 
26 percent of savings accrue by 2016, 
only 1 percentage point higher than the 
president’s plan. The commission’s freeze 
proposal would be the equivalent of 
immediately and permanently cutting all 
discretionary spending, excluding overseas 
operations costs, by 8.8 percent beginning 
in fiscal year 2011.
Option 4: Bipartisan Policy Center 
(Freeze nominal Budget Authority 
for Four or Five years, Cap growth 
Thereafter at gDP)
The Bipartisan Policy Center’s (BPC) 
Debt Reduction Task Force proposed a 
four-year nominal freeze on non-defense 
discretionary budget authority and a 
five-year freeze on defense discretionary 
budget authority. Growth in budget 
authority would be capped at GDP growth 
afterwards. It is important to note that 
BPC used a baseline whereby discretionary 
budget authority increased by GDP rather 
than inflation over the next 10 years, 
so BPC’s proposal yields greater savings 
under their assumptions than under CBO’s 
baseline.
Nevertheless, Pew calculated that this 
option would save $583 billion in direct 
and interest outlays through 2021, 
the second highest 10-year savings of 
the four options. About $280 billion 
(48 percent) of these savings would be 
accrued by 2016. The BPC approach 
would be the equivalent of immediately 
and permanently cutting all discretionary 
spending, excluding overseas operations 
costs, by 3.3 percent beginning in fiscal 
year 2011.
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Without a freeze on discretionary 
spending, Pew’s baseline assumes deficits 
in excess of 5 percent of GDP for the next 
10 years (see Figure 8). Five of the next  
10 years have projected deficits above  
6 percent of GDP under Pew’s baseline. 
Each of the four discretionary freeze 
options would reduce the deficit, but none 
of the options alone would be sufficient 
to meet the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform’s goal of 
lowering the deficit to 3 percent of GDP 
by fiscal year 2015. Option 3, the freeze 
in the final proposal from the National 
Commission’s co-chairs, would have the 
greatest effect on the long-term deficit, 
lowering the deficit in 2021 from 6.5 
percent of GDP under the Pew baseline 
to 5.2 percent of GDP. However, if policy 
makers choose, any one of these proposals 
could be part of a larger package of 
remedies to cut the deficit and lower the 
debt. 
Without a freeze, the federal debt would 
grow to 97 percent of GDP in 2021 under 
Pew’s baseline (see Figure 9). The different 
options would have varying effects on  
the debt. Both Option 1 (the president’s  
proposed spending freeze) and Option 2  
(the Pledge to America’s rollback and 
freeze) would have similar effects,  
lowering federal debt in 2021 to about  
95 percent of GDP. By contrast, Option 
3 (the National Commission’s proposal) 
would lower debt in 2021 to 91 percent  
of GDP. The options that would 
freeze both defense and non-defense 
discretionary budget authority (or security 
and non-security) would have larger effects 
than those that only froze non-defense  
or non-security budget authority. 
Under any of the four options, however, 
federal debt still would be on an upward 
trajectory, and none of the individual 
options alone would achieve a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 60 percent as recommended 
by the European Union, the International 
Monetary Fund, the Peterson-Pew 
Commission on Budget Reform and 
the National Academy of Public 
Administration.
What Budget areas Would 
Be affected the Most by a 
Freeze?
Different programs and policy areas have 
grown at different rates in recent history, 
Effects of the Freeze Options on 
the Deficit and the Debt
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and the same will hold true over the 
next 10 years. By extension, a spending 
freeze would also have different fiscal 
impacts depending on the areas being 
targeted. Pew used CBO January 2011 
baseline projections to apply a function-
by-function nominal freeze from fiscal 
years 2012 to 2021 (see Appendix C). 
Pew assumed that Congress does not shift 
funding between budget functions. 
The budget area that would see the 
greatest cumulative cut in nominal terms 
over 10 years would be National Defense 
EFFECTS OF ThE FrEEzE OpTiONS ON ThE DEFiCiT aND ThE DEbT
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SOURCE: Pew analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2011) data.
NOTES: Pew baseline is based on the January 2011 CBO baseline modified to reflect the additional costs of four policies: 
(1) permanent extension of the 2001/2003 tax cuts for all individuals; (2) indexing the 2009 parameters of the Alternative 
Minimum Tax to inflation; (3) permanent extension of the parameters of the estate and gift taxes enacted as part of the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010; and (4) permanently overriding cuts to 
Medicare physician reimbursements scheduled under the Sustainable Growth Rate.
“Option 1” is a freeze of nominal 2011 non-security discretionary budget authority through 2016, with growth capped at 
inflation thereafter.
“Option 2” is a rollback of 2012 non-security discretionary budget authority to real 2008 levels, with growth capped at 
inflation thereafter. 
”Option 3” is a nominal freeze of all non-war 2011 discretionary budget authority through 2012, with a rollback to inflation-
adjusted 2008 budget authority in 2013 and growth capped at half of inflation thereafter.
“Option 4” is a nominal freeze of non-defense discretionary budget authority for four years and defense discretionary budget 
authority for five years, with growth capped at GDP thereafter.
“Deficit Commission Goal” refers to the mission of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform as laid out in 
Executive Order 13531 of February 18, 2010. The commission’s goal was to propose recommendations bringing the federal 
deficit to primary balance—about 3 percent of GDP—by 2015. 
Pew baseline
Option 1: Based on President's FY2012 Budget
Option 2: Based on Republican Pledge to America
Option 3: National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (Bowles-Simpson)
Option 4: Bipartisan Policy Center (Domenici-Rivlin)
Deficit Commission Goal
Federal Deficits Under the Freeze Options, Fiscal Years 2011 – 
2021, Percent of GDP
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EFFECTS OF ThE FrEEzE OpTiONS ON ThE DEFiCiT aND ThE DEbT
(budget function 050), whose outlays 
would fall $773 billion through 2021.  
In relative terms, this is about 10 percent 
of CBO’s projected cumulative outlays 
for National Defense between fiscal 
years 2012 and 2021. By comparison, 
Commerce (budget function 370) 
would see only a $22 billion cumulative 
nominal cut through 2021; however, this 
represents more than half of its projected 
outlays during this period. The effects of a 
nominal freeze vary by function due to 1) 
different CBO assumptions of the 10-year 
growth in each agency’s budget authority, 
and 2) accounting variations specific to 
each budget area (for example, negative 
budget authority resulting from federal 
guarantees of mortgage-backed securities). 
The results also illustrate that the broader 
the freeze, the larger the long-run savings. 
A 10-year nominal freeze that only 
applied to non-defense spending, for 
example, would save about $573 billion 
by 2021, not counting interest savings. By 
expanding the freeze to include defense 
spending in this instance, the 10-year 
savings would more than double. 
SOURCE: Pew analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2011) 
data.
NOTE: Only includes the effects of the discretionary spending 
freezes in each proposal. 
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Section Title
EFFECTS OF ThE FrEEzE OpTiONS ON ThE DEFiCiT aND ThE DEbT
BOX 4: FISCAl EFFECTS OF REDUCIng OR 
ElIMInATIng SPEnDIng On OvERSEAS 
OPERATIOnS 
CBo’s current law baseline assumes that future annual appropriations for the 
overseas operations in iraq and afghanistan will grow with inflation . thus, the  
$159 billion in fiscal year 2011 budget authority for overseas operations stays 
constant in real terms through 2021 under CBo assumptions . this means that 
the CBo baseline assumes there will be no combat troop reductions in iraq and 
afghanistan between 2011 and 2021 . 
What if, however, overseas operations were cut or eliminated? in CBo’s January 
2011 Budget and economic outlook, there is a cost estimate of an alternative option 
to reduce the number of troops in iraq and afghanistan from their current level of 
220,000 to 45,000 by 2015 .1 
as with discretionary spending freezes, cutting funding for overseas operations 
would not stabilize the debt by itself, but it would have a meaningful effect on future 
deficits . CBo estimates that reducing overseas personnel to 45,000 by 2015 would 
cut direct and interest outlays by about $1 .3 trillion dollars over 10 years relative 
to the pew baseline and reduce federal debt in 2021 from 97 percent of gDp to 
91 percent . pew found that this option lowered federal debt by almost as much as 
eliminating all war funding by 2015 .
1 Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook, January 2011, p. 23.
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America’s fiscal trajectory is unsustainable, 
and federal policy makers likely will 
consider a broad range of options to 
reduce deficits and stabilize the debt. 
These include revenue increases and cuts 
in long-term debt drivers such as Medicare 
and Social Security. They also might 
include cuts or freezes on discretionary 
spending, which is not a long-term debt 
driver but could contribute to a larger 
plan. Policy makers should consider that 
even though the economy has been out 
of recession since June 2009, a premature 
cut in federal spending might have a 
negative impact on the nascent economic 
recovery. The risk of slower economic 
growth from spending cuts is higher in the 
short-term but fades over the long-term, 
especially after the economy returns to full 
employment; by contrast, the economic 
risks from growing deficits and debt are 
smaller in the short-term but grow over 
the long-term.
Although Pew makes no recommendations, 
the analysis of the four proposed freeze 
options demonstrates that limits on 
discretionary spending could yield 
meaningful budget savings. The results 
also suggest that the broader the freeze, 
the greater the impact. Although even 
the broadest freeze Pew analyzed was not 
sufficient by itself to stabilize long-term 
federal debt, controlling discretionary 
spending growth could play a role in a 
broad solution to the federal government’s 
fiscal problems.
Conclusion
6
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Budget Authority  
Baseline 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2012-21
Overseas Operations 159 161 163 166 169 172 175 179 182 186 189 1,741
Security (Excluding 
Overseas Operations) 704 714 728 744 761 779 801 823 845 868 890 7,954 
Defense (050)  
Excluding War 551 560 571 584 597 611 628 645 663 680 698 6,237
Non-Defense  
Security 154 154 157 161 164 168 173 178 183 188 192 1,717
non-Security 392 398 405 414 423 432 443 455 466 478 490 4,404 
TOTAL 1,255 1,272 1,297 1,324 1,352 1,383 1,419 1,456 1,494 1,532 1,570 14,099 
Outlays Baseline 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2012-21
Overseas Operations 170 170 168 167 167 170 173 176 180 184 188 1,743
Security (Excluding 
Overseas Operations) 693 696 717 734 749 770 784 800 826 848 870 7,793
Defense (050)  
Excluding War 541 540 557 571 585 603 614 625 647 664 681 6,088 
Non-Defense  
Security 152 156 160 162 164 167 170 175 179 184 189 1,706 
non-Security 511 487 478 478 481 486 496 506 518 530 542 5,001
TOTAL 1,375 1,352 1,364 1,378 1,397 1,426 1,453 1,482 1,524 1,562 1,600 14,538
CbO baseline of Discretionary budget authority and Outlays, 
Fiscal years 2011 – 2021 (in billions of dollars) 
soUrCe: pew calculations using Congressional Budget office (2011) data .
notes: “overseas operations” includes the costs of the operations in iraq and afghanistan . “security” spending includes all 
non-war spending in 1) budget function 050 (national Defense); 2) budget function 150 (international affairs); and 3) all spending 
in the Departments of Homeland security, state and Veterans affairs not classified under budget functions 050 or 150 .
appENDix a
Category Description
FY2010  
Outlays
percent of  
FY2010 Outlays
Average Annual Nominal 
Growth pew projections, 
2011 – 2021
overseas operations operations in iraq and  afghanistan $169 billion 4 .9% 1 .0%
security (excluding  
overseas operations) 
security-related  
discretionary spending $661 billion 19 .1% 2 .1%
non-security all other discretionary spending $519 billion 15 .0% 0 .9%
MAnDATORy includes federal entitlement programs $1,910 billion 55 .3% 5 .3%
InTEREST On ThE 
DEBT
interest payments on  
outstanding publicly-held 
treasury securities
$197 billion 5 .7% 15 .8%
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soUrCe: pew analysis of Congressional Budget office (2011) data .
Components of Federal Outlays, Fiscal year 2010
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Appendix B
budget authority and Outlay Savings from Four Discretionary 
Freeze proposals, Fiscal years 2011 – 2021 (in billions of dollars) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
 2012- 
2016
2012- 
2121
Option 1: Based on President’s FY2012 Budget   
Change in 
non-Security 
BA
0 6 14 22 31 41 44 47 51 54 58 114 367 
Change in 
Outlays 0 3 9 17 26 36 44 51 57 63 70 93 377
Change 
in Direct 
Costs
0 3 9 17 25 34 40 44 48 51 55 87 324 
Change 
in Interest 
 
0 0 0 1 1 3 5 7 9 12 15 5 53
Option 2: Based on Republican Pledge to America  
Change in 
non-Security 
BA
0 26 28 30 33 35 38 41 45 48 51 151 374
Change in 
Outlays 0 14 23 28 33 37 42 47 53 59 65 135 400 
Change 
in Direct 
Costs
0 14 22 26 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 125 335
Change 
in Interest 
 
0 0 1 2 3 4 6 8 11 14 16 10 65
Option 3: National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (Bowles-Simpson)  
Change in 
non-Security 
BA
0 6 28 33 39 45 52 59 67 75 83 151 487
Change in 
Security BA 0 10 59 69 80 93 107 123 138 153 169 312 1,002 
Change in 
Outlays 0 9 55 86 111 136 163 193 225 259 295 397 1,532
Change 
in Direct 
Costs
0 9 54 83 104 123 144 165 188 210 233 373 1,314 
Change 
in Interest 
 
0 0 1 3 7 12 19 28 37 49 62 24 219 
The table below shows the savings in budget authority and outlays from each of the four proposals pew 
analyzed, as well as total five-year and 10-year savings.
* Continued on next page
appENDix b
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* Continued on next page
appENDix b
Option 4: Bipartisan Policy Center (Domenici-Rivlin)  
Change in 
non-Security 
BA
0 7 17 29 42 27 16 5 -6 -18 -31 122 88
Change in 
Security BA 0 11 25 40 56 73 60 48 35 20 5 205 373 
Change in 
Outlays 0 10 30 55 84 101 96 83 65 43 17 280 583 
Change 
in Direct 
Costs
0 10 29 53 79 93 83 65 43 19 -8 263 466
Change 
in Interest 
 
0 0 1 2 5 9 13 18 21 24 26 16 118
soUrCe: pew analysis of Congressional Budget office (2011) data . 
notes: “option 1” is a five-year freeze of nominal fiscal year 2011 non-security discretionary budget authority beginning in 
fiscal year 2012, with growth capped at inflation thereafter . 
“option 2” is a rollback of fiscal year 2012 non-security discretionary budget authority to inflation-adjusted fiscal year 2008 level, 
with growth capped at inflation thereafter . 
“option 3” is a) a one-year freeze of nominal fiscal year 2011 non-security discretionary budget authority; b) a cut of fiscal year 
2013 non-security discretionary budget authority to inflation-adjusted 2008 levels; and c) growth in fiscal year 2014 and beyond 
capped at half of inflation . 
“option 4” is a five-year freeze of nominal defense discretionary budget authority beginning in fiscal year 2012 and a four-year 
freeze of nominal non-defense discretionary budget authority beginning in fiscal year 2012, with growth capped at gDp growth 
thereafter .
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
 2012- 
2016
2012- 
2121
Appendix B – continued
tHe peW CHaritaBle trUsts26
0
2
4
6
8
10
Appendix C
0
200
400
600
800
$1,000 BILLION 
900
700
500
300
100
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
90%
70%
50%
30%
10%
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
200
400
600
800
1000
Nominal Dollars (Left Axis)
As a % of 10-Year Outlays (Right Axis)
N
at
io
na
l D
ef
en
se
 (0
50
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l A
ffa
irs
 (1
50
)
G
en
er
al
 S
ci
en
ce
, S
pa
ce
 &
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (2
50
)
En
er
gy
 (2
70
)
N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 &
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t (
30
0)
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 (3
50
)
C
om
m
er
ce
 (3
70
)
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
(4
00
)
C
om
m
un
ity
 &
 R
eg
io
na
l 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
45
0)
Ed
uc
at
io
n,
 T
ra
in
in
g,
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
&
 S
oc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s 
(5
00
)
H
ea
lth
 (5
50
)
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
(5
70
)
In
co
m
e 
Se
cu
rit
y 
(6
00
)
So
ci
al
 S
ec
ur
ity
 (6
50
)
Ve
te
ra
ns
 B
en
ef
its
 &
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
(7
00
)
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
of
 J
us
tic
e 
(7
50
)
G
en
er
al
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t (
80
0)
$7
73
 B
IL
LI
O
N
10
%
$3
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
5
%
$2
8 
B
IL
LI
O
N
8%
$5
 B
IL
LI
O
N
6%
$4
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
1
0
%
$8
 B
IL
LI
O
N
10
%
$2
2 
B
IL
LI
O
N
$4
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
4%
$1
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
7% $
81
 B
IL
LI
O
N
8%
$5
5 
B
IL
LI
O
N
9%
7%
$1
6 
B
IL
LI
O
N
21
%
$5
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
$8
 B
IL
LI
O
N 12
%
$7
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
11
%
$6
7 
B
IL
LI
O
N
11
%
$2
7 
B
IL
LI
O
N
12
%
51
%
0
200
400
600
800
1000 BILLIONS 0F DOLLARS
900
700
500
300
100
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
90%
70%
50%
30%
10%
Nominal Dollars (Left Axis)
As a % of 10-Year Outlays (Right Axis)
N
at
io
na
l D
ef
en
se
 (0
50
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l A
ffa
irs
 (1
50
)
G
en
er
al
 S
ci
en
ce
, S
pa
ce
 &
 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 (2
50
)
En
er
gy
 (2
70
)
N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 &
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t (
30
0)
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 (3
50
)
C
om
m
er
ce
 (3
70
)
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n 
(4
00
)
C
om
m
un
ity
 &
 R
eg
io
na
l 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
45
0)
Ed
uc
at
io
n,
 T
ra
in
in
g,
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
&
 S
oc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s 
(5
00
)
H
ea
lth
 (5
50
)
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
(5
70
)
In
co
m
e 
Se
cu
rit
y 
(6
00
)
So
ci
al
 S
ec
ur
ity
 (6
50
)
Ve
te
ra
ns
 B
en
ef
its
 &
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
(7
00
)
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
of
 J
us
tic
e 
(7
50
)
G
en
er
al
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t (
80
0)
$7
73
 B
IL
LI
O
N
10
%
$3
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
5%
$2
8 
B
IL
LI
O
N
8%
$5
 B
IL
LI
O
N
6%
$4
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
10
%
$8
 B
IL
LI
O
N
10
%
$2
2 
B
IL
LI
O
N
8%
$4
1 
B
IL
LI
O
N
4%
$1
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
7% $
81
 B
IL
LI
O
N
8%
$5
5 
B
IL
LI
O
N
9%
7%
$1
6 
B
IL
LI
O
N
21
%
$5
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
$8
 B
IL
LI
O
N 12
%
$7
4 
B
IL
LI
O
N
11
%
$6
7 
B
IL
LI
O
N
11
%
$2
7 
B
IL
LI
O
N
12
%
51
%
Cumulative Cut Resulting from a 10-Year Nominal Freeze of 
Budget Authority, in Billions of Dollars and as a Percent of 
Cumulative 2012 – 2021 Projected Outlays Under the CBO 
January 2011 Baseline
The chart below shows how spending in each budget function would fare if nominal fiscal year 
2011 budget authority were frozen for 10 years and if policy makers were not allowed to transfer 
funding between budget functions.
SOURCE: Pew analysis of Congressional Budget Office (2011) data.
NOTE: The discretionary portions of Medicare (budget function 570) and Social Security (budget function 650) are primarily 
administrative costs. A discretionary spending freeze would not directly affect benefit payments authorized for mandatory 
programs.
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For projecting federal debt and deficit 
levels over the next 10 years, Pew’s analysis 
uses a budget model based on data from 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 
The model projects budget authority, 
outlays, deficit and debt at the end of each 
federal fiscal year.
Model Framework 
Components of Pew’s budget model are 
described in the sections below.
Non-interest Outlays, budget 
authority and revenue
Non-interest spending categories used 
in this model include Social Security, 
Medicare net of offsetting premiums, 
other federal medical outlays (which 
include Medicaid, the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program and health exchange 
subsidies), other mandatory outlays and 
total discretionary budget authority and 
outlays. The revenue categories include 
personal income tax, corporate income 
tax, social insurance taxes on wages and 
other revenue. Data for primary spending 
and revenue are drawn from the January 
2011 Budget and Economic Outlook from  
the CBO. 
For projections through 2021, Pew creates 
a baseline that reflects the CBO current-
law baseline, with four permanent policy 
adjustments that have been historically 
extended by Congress: 
 Index the Alternative Minimum Tax 
(AMT) to inflation;
 Provide annual patches to prevent 
scheduled cuts in Medicare physician 
payment rates under the Sustainable 
Growth calculation;
 Extend the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts 
for all individuals; and 
 Extend the estate and gift taxes under 
the parameters included in the Tax 
Relief, Unemployment Insurance 
Reauthorization, and Job Creation 
Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-312).  
Pew’s baseline projection assumes that 
these four policies are enacted without 
offset for the entire fiscal year 2012 to 
2021 period. Pew estimates that these 
policies would increase federal debt by 
more than $4.8 trillion over the next 
10 years if they are not offset by other 
spending cuts or tax increases. 
  
Technical appendix
appENDix D
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interest
This model uses the interest rates implied 
by the CBO baseline, which is found by 
dividing net interest by the average of 
debt held by the public at the beginning 
of the year and at the end of the year. 
Net interest is calculated under different 
policy scenarios by multiplying the 
interest rates described above by the 
average level of debt held by the public 
each year.
Other means of Financing (OmF)
OMF includes various factors that reduce 
or increase the government’s need to 
borrow. A sale of assets, for example, 
provides the government with additional 
funds and reduces its need to borrow 
to finance its deficit; this is recorded 
as a negative OMF value. Certain 
credit financing, however, increases 
the government’s need to borrow, and 
is recorded as a positive OMF value. 
In Pew’s baseline, OMF is equal to the 
level specified in the CBO January 2011 
baseline.
Debt and Deficit
Future levels of deficit and debt are 
derived from the component pieces of the 
model. The deficit is equal to total outlays 
less total revenues. Debt held by the 
public is equal to debt at the beginning  
of the year, plus the deficit and OMF.  
This framework enables the model to 
calculate debt and deficit at the end of 
each fiscal year.
policy simulations
This report examines how various 
discretionary freeze options would affect 
the federal debt and deficit. The CBO 
baseline categorizes discretionary budget 
authority and outlays by defense and non-
defense. For the freeze options involving 
security and non-security spending freezes, 
Pew recategorized the discretionary budget 
authority and outlay totals in the CBO’s 
January 2011 baseline between these 
various spending categories. Pew used a 
detailed version of CBO’s January 2011 
baseline to reallocate spending, then used 
the Public Budget Database of outlays 
and budget authority from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to check 
for consistency.
For simulations involving changes in 
budget authority, Pew used the CBO’s 
August 2010 spend-out rate assumptions 
for defense and non-defense discretionary 
budget authority to derive the outlay 
effects. Pew reweighted these spend-out 
rates for use with security and non-security 
discretionary budget authority.
The model adjusts future discretionary 
budget authority or outlays based on the 
specifications of each freeze. All other 
non-interest spending and revenue remain 
the same as the Pew baseline while interest 
is endogenously determined using the 
implied interest rate. The model then 
calculates future debt and deficit levels 
based on these adjusted levels of outlays. 
As in all the simulations, the interest 
rate and GDP are the same as in the Pew 
baseline.
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1 Federal fiscal years begin on October 1 and end on 
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9 The source for the parameters of Option 1 was Office 
of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States 
Government – Fiscal Year 2012, February 2011.  The 
Office of Management and Budget’s own estimate of 
the direct and interest savings from the president’s 
proposed freeze as written in the fiscal year 2012 
budget is $406 billion over 10 years.
10 See Note 4. Pew also consulted S. 3779, introduced 
on 14 September 2010, for its analysis of Option 2.
11 National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform, The Moment of Truth, December 2010. 
Obtained at http://goo.gl/K8F2m on 24 February 2011. 
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budget authority either by security/non-security or 
defense/non-defense. Pew chose to model its freeze as 
one on security and non-security budget authority.
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Force, Restoring America’s Future, 17 November 2010. 
Obtained at http://bit.ly/cIGZtq on 24 November 2010.
14 Pew used the CBO’s August 2010 10-year spend-
out rate assumptions for defense and non-defense 
discretionary budget authority. Pew reweighted these 
spend-out rates to use for security and non-security 
discretionary budget authority.
15 Budget functions are accounting categories of 
federal spending with similar uses. For example, 
budget function 050 covers national defense spending, 
and includes the Department of Defense as well as 
some spending outside the Department of Defense, 
such as the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
16 See Office of Management and Budget, Budget 
of the United States Government – Fiscal Year 2012, 
February 2011, Table S-11. Security discretionary 
spending includes the discretionary components 
of the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security 
and Veterans Affairs, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, and budget function 150, which 
includes the Department of State and other 
international programs. In the past, the federal 
government has categorized the components of 
discretionary spending differently. For example, 
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ENDNOTES
the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) defined 
three categories of discretionary spending: defense, 
international affairs and domestic. See Title XIII of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Public 
Law 101-508). The 1997 amendments to the BEA 
reduced the number of categories to two: defense 
and non-defense, where defense included only the 
Department of Defense and the National Nuclear 
Security Administration. See Title X of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (Public Law 105-33). The savings 
from freezing or capping a category of discretionary 
spending varies depending on how broadly or 
narrowly that category is defined. In general, the 
narrower the target of a freeze, the smaller the long-
term budget savings.
17 Congressional Budget Office (2011), p. 21.
18 Pew used the CBO’s January 2011 forecast of the 
GDP price index as its measure of inflation for each 
option.
19 “Equivalent cuts” for each option show the 
percentage permanent cut to that option’s spending 
base in 2011 sufficient to bring the debt-to-GDP 
ratio to the same level in 2021 as the option itself. 
Pew assumes that spending grows at its baseline rate 
(inflation) after the cuts in 2011.
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